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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STRATEGY, AND SUPPLY
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF COMPANIES LISTED IN THE SÃO PAULO
STOCK EXCHANGE
Wesley Mendes-da-Silva
Ervin L. Black*
I. SUMMARY
Recently, increased competition has prompted companies to
enhance their organizational efficiency. One of the areas most
influenced by this pressure is supply management, which uses a
large percentage of corporate assets and has the potential to
negatively affect customer service. Another central area of
organizational efficiency is corporate governance, which is
regarded as a determining factor for administrative excellence.
This paper examines whether the corporate governance
structures of firms with diversified suppliers differ from those of
firms with more specialized or concentrated suppliers. This study
consists of multiple cross sections that cover the period between
1997 and 2001 and incorporates data collected from 176 industrial
companies from fourteen industrial segments that listed stocks in
Bovespa, the São Paulo Stock Exchange. This study based its
exploration on the premise that minimized inventory and minimized
days’ sales in inventory ratios define the best-performing supply
management.1
The two following propositions summarize the principal results
of this study. First, increased independence of the chairman of the
board of directors tends to result in less efficient supply
management. This conclusion is drawn from the following two
findings: (i) an independent chairman of the board uses more
diversified suppliers than an internal chairman and (ii) greater

* Wesley Mendes-da-Silva is an assistant professor of the integrated faculty of
Recife and the Recife Laboratory of Finance at the Federal University of Pernambuco
in Brazil. Ervin L. Black is an associate professor of the Marriott School of
Management at Brigham Young University. Special thanks to the three ILMR editors,
who translated this article from Portuguese into English: Thomas J. Campbell, Nicole
W. Empie, and Alexander Fuentes.
1
Number of days it takes to turn over the inventory one time.

43

I NTERNATIONAL L AW & M ANAGEMENT R EVIEW

V OLUME 2

supplier diversification is directly associated with a larger
inventory. Second, an independent board of directors correlates
with less efficient results due to its significant and positive
association with day’s sales in inventory ratio. These results
collectively suggest that strategies utilized by independent
corporate governance structures tend to result in less efficient
supply management.
II. INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, a company’s performance largely depends on the
executives’ choices in management strategies. In their seminal
study, Jensen and Meckling (1976, 308–9) discuss the agency
theory, which examines the relationships between principals (e.g.,
stockholders) and their agents (e.g., executives). Company owners
have strategic interests in improving the company’s performance.
However, the decision-making power lies in the hands of the
executives who are hired by the owners through the advice of the
directors. According to this view, the following factors determine
the company’s maximum performance: (i) the technical competence
of the executives chosen to direct the company’s activities, (ii) the
alignment of executives’ interests with owners’ interests, and (iii)
the adequacy of the corporate governance structures responsible for
balancing the relationship between principals and agents.
One example of the competing interests at stake here is that of
the shareholders’ strategic interests, which may lie in choosing to
diversify the company’s portfolio of suppliers. On the other hand,
company executives may let their personal needs and desires
interfere with the task of diversifying suppliers. Aside from the
conflict of interests between shareholders and executives,
relationships between the company and its suppliers affect the
structure of the company’s supply network. When the company
chooses to work with a small number of suppliers, it tends to have
more cooperative and long-lasting relationships with its suppliers.
Conversely, if the company chooses a more diversified supplier
system, the company will develop short-term relationships based on
lowest-price competition among suppliers.
The majority of studies on corporate governance focus on
economics and finance, concentrating on the impact of governing
structures on the economic and financial development of
companies. Consequently, studies on corporate governance in terms
of supply management are negligible. The recognition that supply
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management constitutes a significant part of corporate
management, especially in industrial companies, motivated this
study. This article fills the performance measurement gap by
examining the relationship between corporate governance
structures, supplier diversification strategies, and the supply
management performance of Brazilian industrial companies.
The study is comprised from multiple cross sections covering
the period between 1997 and 2001, including data from 176
industrial companies from fourteen different industries trading on
Bovespa, the São Paulo Stock Exchange. This study based its
exploration on the premise that two factors define the bestperforming supply management: minimized inventory and
minimized days’ sales in inventory ratio.
The following sections of this paper more fully explain the
findings of this study. Section Three presents the theoretical basis
for the study, including the basic theory of corporate governance
and a comparison of two different supply management performance
principles. Section Four then details the methodology employed to
conduct the study. Section Five discusses the results of the study,
ending with the conclusions in Section Six.
III. THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE STUDY
A. Corporate Governance
In developed countries, agency problems 2 result in high costs
for shareholders. Corporate governance, which is concerned with

2

According to many authors, including Bebchuk and Fried (2003), agency
problems can arise from (i) profit-sharing bonuses, contingency fees, sales
commissions, merit raises, executive stock options, and various other contractually
specified methods of setting the amount of the agent’s financial compensation in
proportion to measurable results; (ii) organizational hiring and promotion policies for
people in responsible positions (agents) that emphasize identifying and selecting
candidates whose reputation (based ideally on past performance) indicate they are
“well-motivated,” “dedicated to the ethics of the profession,” and generally “of good
character” — i.e., people who feel a strong sense of moral obligation to do their best to
do what they have promised to do, even when no one is likely watching; (iii)
institutional arrangements of accountability (such as boards of directors, auditing
committees, inspector generals’ offices, professional society ethics committees, and
government regulatory boards) for detecting and then punishing extreme dereliction of
duty, either by simply firing and disgracing (or perhaps de-licensing) the unworthy
agent or possibly by aggressively pursuing civil or criminal penalties through the
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increasing the security of investors’ returns, aims at guaranteeing
disclosure, accountability, owners’ equity, and compliance with
local laws. By doing so, corporate governance ameliorates
problems that result from the separation of ownership and control
in modern corporations (La Porta et al. 1998). Corporate
governance oversees the control and monitoring systems
established by the controlling shareholders so that executives are
required to make their decisions of resource allocation according to
shareholder interests. Effective corporate governance requires the
following: (i) a separation and balance of powers between
executive officers, the board of directors, and stockholders; (ii) the
presence of independent members on the board of directors,
although not all members are required to be independent; and (iii) a
convergence of interests for controlling shareholders, members of
the board of directors, and all other members of the company.
B. Supplier Diversification
Studies conducted in Brazil and in other countries have
indicated that the cost of inventory has a large impact on the
general costs of production (Gonçalves 2004). In many companies,
particularly industrial companies, a large percentage of the assets
consist of inventory. Inventory consists of any quantity of physical
goods that are conserved, unproductively, for any given time period
(Moreira 1992, 464). Maintaining inventory means incurring costs,
such as opportunity costs from the idle capital, potential costs due
to lost or damaged inventory, and storage and handling costs. On
the other hand, maintaining inventory allows the company to: (i)
improve its services through improved responsiveness in the
delivery process, (ii) increase product availability, (iii) purchase or
produce lower-cost goods by using economies of scale, and (iv)
adjust to fluctuations in supply and demand (Moreira 1992; Slack et
al. 1996; Gaither and Frazier 1998; Chase et al. 1998; Chopra and
Meindl 2003; Viana 2000; Bowersox and Closs 2001; Ballou 2001,
249–338).
Two important hypotheses enhance understanding of the
strategic purchasing choices that logistics managers make. The first
courts; or (iv) arrangements such as elections whereby the agent’s principals may
periodically scrutinize the recent performance of the agent and competing candidates
for the job may make their case for replacing the incumbent agent by revealing his or
her shortcomings and showing how performance might be improved through a change
in command.
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hypothesis postulates that companies should limit the number of
suppliers (single-sourcing) to establish lasting relationships with
suppliers, thereby obtaining better supplier performance (Adkins
and Diller 1983; Reck and Long 1985; Dwyer et al. 1987; Newman
1988; Rubin and Carter 1990). In an analysis of single-sourcing,
Swift (1995) reveals that purchasing managers who choose a
single-sourcing strategy are initially less interested in low prices
and more interested in the future life of a product. Single-sourcing
structures ensure a greater ability to make technical support and
integrity available to the client compared to multiple-sourcing
structures.
The second hypothesis suggests that companies should maintain
a diversified portfolio of suppliers (multiple-sourcing) to stimulate
competition between the suppliers, thereby obtaining better
performance for the company (Foster 1992, 38–46; Foster and
Barks 1990). Historically, purchasing managers have maintained
two or more active suppliers for each product group to keep costs
low. The competition among suppliers reduces prices, improves the
quality of service, and reduces the risk of lack of materials (Monks
1987). In addition, a diversified supply system provides an
effective means of controlling suppliers’ behavioral patterns
(Krause et al. 2000, 33–35; Krause and Scanell 2002, 14). Slack
summarizes some of the advantages and disadvantages of singlesourcing vs. multiple-sourcing supply schemes (Slack et al. 1996,
417). Figure 1 below shows the results.
Figure 1 – Advantages and Disadvantages of Single- and
Multiple-Sourcing
Strategy

SingleSourcing

Advantages
• Better quality inventory
due to greater availability
of quality-control systems
• Stronger and longer-lasting
relationships
• Greater dependence results
in greater commitment and
effort
• Better communication
• Greater cooperation in the
development of new
products and services
• More economies of scale
• Greater confidentiality

Disadvantages
• Greater vulnerability to
problems if failures occur in
the supply source
• Greater effect of fluctuations
in demand on individual
suppliers
• Greater opportunity for
suppliers to increase prices
when no other supplier is
available
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Advantages
Disadvantages
• Less opportunity to
• Greater opportunity for
buyer to drive prices down
encourage the commitment
due to competition among
level of the supplier
suppliers
• More difficult to develop
• Easier to switch to a
efficient systems for quality
different supplier in the
control
event of failure by another • Greater effort required for
supplier
communication
• Greater knowledge of
• Less investment on the part
sources and specialization
of the suppliers
• More difficult to obtain
economies of scale

According to Chopra and Meindl (2003) and Bowersox and
Closs (2001), one of the basic objectives of logistics management is
to minimize the inventory in order to reduce total logistical costs.
Executives increasingly recognize and appreciate concepts like just
in time and zero inventory as they try to capture value by reducing
idle inventories. Chopra and Meindl further maintain that
executives can reduce inventory by decreasing the costs incurred
for orders and transportation as well as by implementing discount
schemes based on total annual volume rather than individual
purchase quantities. Either scheme, however, is practical to the
extent that managers maintain good relationships with suppliers.
Accordingly, one of the principal challenges for inventory
managers is to reduce the amount of unused inventory without
jeopardizing the ability to deliver goods to customers promptly.
However, the goal of reducing inventory is incompatible with
the goal of diversifying suppliers. Generally speaking, companies
can achieve cost savings by establishing solid and exclusive
relationships with a small number of suppliers. Companies need
suppliers they can trust in order to benefit from functioning with
lower levels of inventory (Monks 1987, 264). Strategic partnerships
with suppliers reduce costs as suppliers provide goods that have
more compatibility with the buyer’s processes and purposes. Cost
savings materialize with a drop in the number of returns and
decreases in idle inventory.
According to Chen and Yang (2002, 60), companies now want
to reduce the number of their suppliers and establish long-term,
purchaser-supplier relationships with fewer suppliers for the
purpose of securing a competitive edge by improving their supply
efficiency. The principle, known as just in time, involves working
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with the fewest number of suppliers possible—perhaps as few as
one supplier for every group of materials—thus allowing managers
to cultivate long and committed relationships with the suppliers,
improve the replenishment system, and achieve the consequential
reduction of expenses incurred for inventory and supplies (Chase et
al. 1998, 482). Using Brazilian companies, Mendes-da-Silva and
Pontual (2004) provide evidence that managers need to develop
lasting relationships with a limited number of suppliers while
seeking to minimize idle inventory.
C. Corporate Governance and Supply Management
Corporate governance studies have been largely limited to
analyses of the impact of governance on productivity in industrial
companies. Köke (2001) analyzes 841 German companies between
1986 and 1996 and finds evidence that companies with more
concentrated power structures tend to enjoy higher productivity
than companies with less concentrated power structures. According
to Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997), managers in companies
with highly concentrated ownership work under greater pressure
and tighter controls.
Similarly, research conducted by Januszewski, Köke, and
Winter (2001) deals with the behavioral patterns of 500 German
companies between 1986 and 1994. In their research, they find
strong, albeit inconclusive, evidence supporting the hypothesis that
companies led by the majority shareholder have greater
productivity, except in cases where the majority shareholder is a
financial institution. This finding indicates that an independent
chairman of the board may not ensure the most productive
governance structure.
In turn, Destefanis and Sena’s (2004) study explores the
relation between corporate governance systems adopted by Italian
industries and their respective technical efficiency. From 1994 to
1997 they analyzed 3,728 companies from nine industrial sectors.
Their analysis notes that although quite a few studies on the issue
have been conducted, the relationship between corporate
governance and organizations’ technical efficiency is still unclear.
According to the study, companies with high concentrations of
ownership benefit from the owners’ significant interest in
maximizing organizational profits, even though the expropriation of
minority stockholders is a risk. This study demonstrates that high
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concentrations of ownership positively affect a company’s technical
efficiency.
Studies on the correlations between corporate governance and
supply management performance are almost non-existent. With this
in mind, this study seeks to explore what impact, if any,
independence of the board and the chairman of the board have on
inventory management patterns.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Sample, Data, and Variables
The sample consists of data from companies from fourteen
different industrial segments. Table 1 illustrates the frequency of
each industry. The authors collected data from the Economática®
Database and the Annual Information Reports (IAN) that the
companies send to the Brazilian Securities and Exchange
Commission (CVM).
Table 1 – Frequency of Participating Companies by
Economic Sector
Sector

Frequency Percentage

Chemical

27

15.3

Textile
Metallurgy

26
24

14.8
13.6

Vehicles and
Parts
Food and
Drinks
Electronics

18

10.2

15

8.5

11

6.3

Construction

11

6.3

Sector

Frequency Percentage

Industrial
Machines
Others
Paper and
Cellulose
Electric
Energy
Mining

10

5.7

10
8

5.7
4.5

6

3.4

4

2.3

Petroleum
and Gas
Minerals
and
Metals
Total

3

1.7

3

1.7

176

100.0

Source: Created from the research data of the authors (2005).

As of May 2001, 289 of the 459 companies listed on the São
Paulo Stock Exchange had their data registered on the
Economática® Database. The authors limited their study to
manufacturing companies that had available data for at least three
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of the five years from 1997 to 2001. As a result, they analyzed a
total of 176 manufacturing companies with outstanding shares of
stock. Table 2 describes the calculation of performance variables
for supply management, corporate governance, and supplier
diversification. Employing the method recommended by Hair et al.
(1998), outliers were removed to ensure a normal distribution of the
data.
Table 2 – Description of Studied Variables

Dependent
Variables

Variable – Description

Conceptual
Sources

lnEstq – Natural log of the inventory value in
balance sheet of a company i in year t, adjusted
for inflation.

Moreira
(1992);
Bowersox
and Closs
(2001);
Chopra and
Meindl
(2003)

Hforn♣ – Index of concentration of the three
main suppliers of company i in year t calculated
by the equation:

Mendes-daSilva and
Pontual
(2004);
2
3
⎞
⎛ fi
Foster
Hforn = ∑ ⎜ ×100⎟
F
(1992);
⎠
⎝
i =1
Newman
Where fi is the value of the purchases carried
(1989);
through with a certain supplier and F is the total
Rubin and
value of purchases by the company i in year t.
Carter
The value of Hforn is maximized when the
(1990)
participation of a sole supplier in the purchases of
the company reaches 100%, and in these terms
Hforn = 10.000.
Pme♦ – Days’ sales in inventory for company i,
in year t. It is calculated by the expression
(Inventory/Cost of Goods Sold) × 360.

Moreira
(1992);
Bowersox
and Closs
(2001);
Chopra and
Meindl
(2003)
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Sources

Indpr♣ – A bifurcated variable that expresses the Bhagat and
Black
independence of the chairman of the board of a
(2002)
company. It is assigned a value = 1 if the
chairman of the board does not simultaneously
occupy a position as an executive officer
(independent), and a value = 0 in the alternative
(not independent).
Indco♣ – Proxy that measures the degree of
independence of the board of directors of the
company. It is expressed by the fraction of total
members of the board of directors that are
independent (the percentage of the board that
does not simultaneously belong to the board of
directors and hierarchy of executives of the
company) in year t.

Bhagat and
Black
(2002);
Dutra and
Saito (2002)

Hpod♦ – Index of concentration of voting power
controlled by the three main shareholders.
Calculated by the following equation:

Hoskisson
et al. (1994)

3
⎛p
⎞
Hpod = ∑⎜ i ×100⎟
⎠
i =1 ⎝ P

2

Where pi is the number of common shares of a
company i controlled by a certain stockholder,
and P represents the total quantity of common
shares of the considered company.
Control
Variables
(VC)
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Estd♣ – A Politomic variable that expresses the
Brazilian state where the headquarters of the
company are installed. Value = 1 if in São Paulo;
value = 2 if in Minas Gerais; value = 3 if in Santa
Catarina; value = 4 if in Paraná; value = 5 if in
Rio Grande do Sul; value = 6 if in Rio de Janeiro;
value = 7 if in Amazonas; value = 8 if in Mato
Grosso; value = 9 if in Ceará; value = 10 if in
Bahia; value = 11 if in Espírito Santo; value = 12
if in Rio Grande do Norte.

N/A
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Sect♦ – A Politomic variable that expresses the
industrial sector in which the company operates.
Value = 1 if in metallurgy; value = 2 if in
chemistry; value = 3 if in electric energy; value =
4 if in vehicles/parts; value = 5 if in textiles;
value = 6 if in food/drinks; value = 7 if in
electronics; value = 8 if in construction; value = 9
if in industrial machines; value = 10 if in mining;
value = 11 if in petroleum/gas; value = 12 if in
nonmetallic minerals; value = 13 if in
paper/cellulose; value = 14 if in other sectors.

N/A

lnTamf♦ – The size of company i expressed by
the natural log of the total assets of the company
in year t, adjusted for inflation.

Bhagat and
Black
(2002)

Ano♣ – Politomic variable that expresses the year
to which the data referring to company i belongs.
Value = 1 if it is from 1997; value = 2 if it is
from 1998; value = 3 if it is from 1999; value = 4
if it is from 2000; value = 5 if it is from 2001.

N/A

lnTamc♣ – Natural log of the number of
members of the board of a company i, in the
year t.

Bhagat and
Black
(2002)

Operational source: ♦Economática® data base; ♣IAN/CVM.

B. The Models
The following three hypotheses examine the alleged existence
of a meaningful relationship between corporate governance,
supplier diversification strategies, and supply management
performance of Brazilian industrial companies:
H1: Companies will have better supply management
performance (as demonstrated by lower inventory values
(lnEstq) and lower days’ sales in inventory ratio (Pme))
when both the chairman of the board (Indpr) and the other
members of the board (Indco) are independent of the
company.
H2: The independence of the board (Indco) and the
independence of the chairman of the board (Indpr) are
significantly and negatively associated with supplier
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concentration in the firm (Hforn) due to the conflict of
interests between stockholders and executives.
H3: Significant association exists between single-sourcing
(Hforn) and supply management performance.
To test the hypotheses, the authors formulated a multivariate
regression model for each of the dependent variables. Equations
(1), (2), and (3) illustrate the models.
(1)
k

ln Estqi = β 0 + β1Indcoi + β 2 Indpri + β 3 ln Tamci + β 4 Hpod i + β 5 Hforni + ∑ ψ jVC ji +ξ
j =1

(2)

Hforn i = β 0 + β 1 Indco i + β 2 Indpr i + β 3 ln Tamc i + β 4 Hpod i +

k

∑ψ

j

VC

ji

+ξ

j =1

(3)
k

Pmei = β 0 + β1Indcoi + β 2 Indpri + β 3 ln Tamci + β 4 Hpodi + β 5 Hforni + ∑ψ jVC ji +ξ
j =1

Based on the first hypothesis (H1) that companies will have better
supply management performance (as demonstrated by lower inventory
values (lnEstq) and lower days’ sales in inventory ratio (Pme)) when
both the chairman of the board (Indpr) and the other members of the
board (Indco) are independent of the company; one expects
coefficients β1 and β2 in equations (1) and (3) to be negative and
statistically significant. The second hypothesis (H2) posits that the
independence of the board (Indco) and the independence of the
chairman of the board (Indpr) are each significantly and negatively
associated with supplier concentration in the firm (Hforn) and leads
one to expect that coefficients β1 and β2 in equation (2) should assume
significant negative values (β1<0; β2<0). The third hypothesis (H3),
which deals with the relationship between supplier concentration and
supply management performance, proposes that coefficient β5 should
be statistically significant in equations (1) and (3).
The authors selected control variables (CV) 3 to make up for
possible third-variable effects on the dependent variables (Hforn,
lnEstq, and Pme) and the independent variables (Indpr, Indco, and

3

If the independent control variables have significant correlation with any of the
variables but do not receive consideration in the proposed models, the relationship
between variables cannot be accurately verified.
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Hpod). The study uses the following control variables: (i) the Brazilian
state where the company’s headquarters are located (Estd), (ii) the
industrial sector of the company (Sect), (iii) the size of the firm
(lnTamf), (iv) the fiscal year to which the information belongs (Ano),
and (v) the size of the board of directors (lnTamc). Table 2 defines all
of the other variables.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3 shows the absence or presence of correlation between
the variables. As expected, there seems to be a strong correlation
between firm size (Tamf) and the following three factors: (i) the
independence of the board of directors (Indco), (ii) the
independence of the chairman of the board (Indpr), and (iii) the size
of the board of directors (Tamc). The industrial sector (Sect) and
the state where the company is headquartered (Estd) each correlate
with both inventory values (Estq) and supplier diversification levels
(Hforn). This expected correlation reflects the differing state
economies that varied supplier disposition by region. These
variations by sector create unique, regional, supplier diversification
strategies and inventory management practices.
Table 3 – Matrix of Correlations between the Variables Studied
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.Estq 1
2.Pme -.008 1
3.Hforn -.004 .008 1
4.Indco .105** .049 -.033 1
5.Indpr .148** .037 -.128* .563** 1
6.Tamc .141** -.056 -.080 .335** .292** 1
7.Hpod -.063 .064 .086
-.146** -.121** -.276** 1
8.Estd .075* -.023 .105* .030
.044
-.004 -.074* 1
9.Tamf .849** -.011 .039
.136** .161** .179** -.063 .073*
10.Sect .082* .033 -.170** .022
.058
.097** .003 -.017
11. Ano .032 .031 .022
-.030
-.042 -.015 .098** .000
Source: Created by the authors from the data (2005).
Notes: **Significance at 1%; *Significance at 5%; N minimum: 386;
880.

9

10

11

1
.044 1
.003 .000 1
N Maximum:

The study used a T-test to verify the existence of meaningful
difference in the mean values assumed by the dependent variables
(Estq, Pne, and Hforn) between companies with independent
chairmen of the board and those without independent chairmen.

55

I NTERNATIONAL L AW & M ANAGEMENT R EVIEW

V OLUME 2

Before proceeding with the T-test, the equality of the variance
between these two sets of companies was also tested. According to
the Levene Test, the hypothesis of the equality of the variances
could not be rejected at a significance level of 5%. Accordingly,
both the diversification of the supplier portfolio (t = -2.389; Sig. <
0.05) and the quantifiable value of the inventory (t = 3.954; Sig. <
0.05) prove to be significantly different for companies that maintain
the independence of the chairman of the board (Indpr) as compared
to those companies that do not.
Table 4 – Calculations from T-test of the Equality of Means as
Applied to Independence of the Chairman of the Board (Indpr)
Dependent
t
Variables statistics
Estq
Pme
Hforn

Df

3.954
700
0.972 352.115
-2.389 342

Sig.
Average
(2-tailed) Deviation
0.000
0.331
0.017

191,831.993
103.293
- 1,207.168

Standard Interval of Deviation with
Error of
95% Confidence
Deviation
Low
High
48,518.954 96,571.881 287,092.105
106.220
-105.61377
312.200
505.391
-2201.236
-213.100

Source: Created by the authors using data from the study (2005).
Note: Statistics software SPSS® 12.0 was used for the treatment of the data.

Table 5 illustrates the results of the multivariate regressions. In
analyzing the results of the calculated parameters for a multivariate
regression, Granger and Newbold (1974, 111–20) and Savin and
White (1977) recommend checking the regression results for the
presence of spurious regression (first-order autoregressive errors).4
In this study, the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is closer to 2,
suggesting no autocorrelation.5
These statistics support the hypothesis that the independence of
the chairman of the board of directors (Indpr) is significantly and
4
If two stationary variables are generated as an independent random series, when
one of those variables is regressed on the other, the t-ratio on the slope coefficient is
expected not to be significantly different from zero and the value of R2 is expected to
be very low. This seems obvious because the variables hold no relation to one another.
However, if two variables are trending over time, a regression of one on the other
could have a high R2 even if the two are totally unrelated. Therefore, if standard
regression techniques are applied, the end result could be a regression that “looks”
good under standard measures (significant coefficient estimates and a high R2), but
which really has no value. Such a model would be termed a “spurious regression”
(Brooks 2002, 367–68).
5
According to Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lütkepohl, and Lee (1988, 394–95), the
Durbin-Watson test statistic d indicates the likelihood of autocorrelation. A value of d
close to 0 indicates positive autocorrelation, a value close to 4 indicates negative
autocorrelation, and a value around 2 suggests no autocorrelation.
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negatively associated with the concentration of suppliers (Hforn).
Therefore, companies with a chairman of the board that is
independent from its directors generally have greater supplier
diversification (t = -2.154; Sig < 0.05). However, the independence
of the board of directors (Indco) is not significantly associated with
the concentration of suppliers, supporting the rejection of part of
H2. A third measure of corporate governance, the concentration of
stockholders’ voting power (Hpod), is positively associated with
the concentration of the portfolio of suppliers. Therefore, this study
supports the idea that single-sourcing is significantly associated
with the independence of the chairman of the board and the
concentration of stockholders’ voting power.
Table 5 – Calculated Parameters for Multiple Regression
Dependent Independent Expected
Variables Variables
Sign
LnEstq

Hforn

(Constant)
Indco
Indpr
Lntamc
Hpod
Estd
Lntamf
Sect
Ano
Hforn
N = 335
(Constant)
Indco
Indpr
Lntamc
Hpod
Estd
Lntamf
Sect
Ano
N = 335

(-)
(-)
(-)

?√
(-)x
(-)√
(+)

Standardized
Coefficients
(Beta)
-0.034
-0.031
0.095***
-0.004
-0.037
0.834***
-0.175***
0.009
-0.141***
0.074
-0.143**
-0.028
0.097*
0.057
0.090
-0.186***
-0.014

Statistic t
(R2) [d]

Sig.

-2.627
-0.937
-0.855
2.706
-0.114
-1.237
24.566
-5.647
0.310
-4.723
(0.735)[1.403]
-0.311
1.100
-2.154
-0.441
1.683
1.024
1.459
-3.320
-0.268
(0.067)[1.522]

0.009
0.349
0.393
0.007
0.909
0.217
0.000
0.000
0.756
0.000
0.756
0.272
0.032
0.660
0.093
0.306
0.145
0.001
0.789
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Dependent Independent Expected
Variables Variables
Sign

Pme

(Constant)
Indco
Indpr
Lntamc
Hpod
Estd
Lntamf
Sect
Ano
Hforn
N = 335

(-)x
(-)
(-)
(-)

Standardized
Coefficients
(Beta)

0.117*
0.035
-0.163**
0.032
-0.029
-0.039
0.045
0.040
0.021

V OLUME 2

Statistic t
(R2) [d]

Sig.

0.438
1.696
0.509
-2.467
0.530
-0.504
-0.618
0.762
0.721
0.371
(0.046)[2.011]

0.662
0.091
0.611
0.014
0.596
0.615
0.537
0.447
0.472
0.711

Source: Created by the authors based on data from the study (2005). This table
presents the results of the multiple regression, using each of three dependent variables:
lnEstq, Hforn, and Pme. Table 2 defines the dependent and independent variables. The
authors processed the data on the statistics software SPSS® version 12.0; they selected
the option Enter.
Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; x: hypothesis
rejected; √: hypothesis not rejected; boldface type: statistically significant variables;
coefficient of determination (R2): between parentheses; statistic Durbin-Watson [d]:
between brackets.

Analysis of the size of a company’s inventory (lnEstq) reveals
that single-sourcing is significantly associated with the size of the
inventory (t = -4.723; Sig < 0.01). This result corroborates the just
in time principle that endorses lasting relationships with fewer
suppliers for more reliable deliveries and improved supply
management (Gianesi and Corrêa 1996). Therefore, the authors
cannot reject hypothesis H3 at the significance level of one percent.
Additionally, the size of the board of directors (lnTamc) and the
size of the company (lnTamf) are each positively associated with
the size of the company’s inventory (t = 2.706; Sig < 0.01).
Only two variables proved to be significantly associated with
the average days’ sales in inventory ratio (Pme). The independence
of the board of directors (Indco) at the significance level of ten
percent has a marginally positive association with Pme (t = 1.696;
Sig < 0.1). The correlation suggests that, generally, the more
independent the board, the higher the days’ sales in inventory ratio.
In other words, the study suggests that companies with an
independent chairman of the board tend to have less efficient
supply management systems. On the other hand, Indpr
(independence of the chairman of the board of directors) has no
significant relation to the average days’ sales in inventory ratio or
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the size of the inventory. Accordingly, this result half confirms and
half rejects hypothesis H1 that companies will have better supply
management performance when both the chairman of the board and
the board itself are independent of the company.
The second significant independent variable (the size of the
board of directors (lnTAMC)) had a negative association with the
dependent variable Pme. This association suggests that, generally,
the greater the size of the board of directors, the lower the days’
sales in inventory ratio. In other words, companies with larger
boards of directors have more effective supply management,
indicated by lower days’ sales in inventory ratio (t = -2.467; Sig <
0.05). Figure 2 summarizes the results for the three formulated
hypotheses.
Figure 2 – Summary of the Results of the Study
Governance and supplier
diversification strategy variables
(independent variables)
Indco
Indpr Hpod
Hforn
Strategy and
supply
management
performance
variables
(dependent
variables)

lnEstq
Hforn

( - )1%
( - )5% ( + )10%

Pme
( + )10%
H1: positive association
between the independence Negative Negative
of the board of directors
and supply management
performance
Expected
outcomes
H2: positive association
for the
between the independence Negative Negative
hypotheses
of the board of directors
and supplier
diversification
H3: significant association
between supplier
?
diversification and supply
management performance
Note: The sign of the coefficient obtained in the model is enclosed by parentheses.
The percentage represents the level of statistical significance of the coefficient based
on the t-statistic. The sign indicated for each hypothesis H1, H2, and H3 reflects the
originally expected outcome.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Strategic decisions by the highest level of management are
crucial to a company’s pursuit of superior performance. However,
executive officers may interfere with a company’s chosen strategies
by pursuing personal interests at the expense of corporate
objectives. In order to increase shareholder value, management
systems should represent corporate interests and not the personal
interests of the executive officers.
With such agency problems in mind, this study explores what
impact, if any, the independence of a chairman has on inventory
management patterns. This study based its exploration on the
premise that the best-performing supply management systems are
defined by two factors: (i) minimized inventory and (ii) minimized
days’ sales in inventory ratio. Interestingly, this study shows that
the independence of the chairman of the board of directors is
positively associated with the size of inventory, whereas the
independence of the board of directors is positively associated with
the days’ sales in inventory ratio.
This study shows that an independent chairman of the board
uses more diversified suppliers than an internal chairman. 6 It
further indicates that greater supplier diversification has direct
association with a larger inventory. 7 Therefore, this study can
conclude that the independence of a chairman of the board of
directors tends to result in less efficient supply management. The
independence of the board of directors also turns out to have a
negative impact on supply management performance. According to
the above analysis, the independence of the board of directors is
significantly and positively associated with the day’s sales in
inventory ratio. 8 In other words, the more independent the board,
the higher days’ sales in inventory ratio, or the company retains
idle inventory for a longer period of time. As such, the results
collectively suggest that the independent corporate governance

6

This result may reflect the reality of agency costs since executives who opt to
maintain a more diversified supplier portfolio most likely attempt to minimize their
employment risks rather than maximize shareholders’ interests.
7
However, the independence of the entire board of directors does not have an
impact on supplier diversification strategies.
8
It was expected that a more independent board of directors would be associated
with lower values for the variable Pme (day’s sales in inventory ratio), but the results
are contrary to the expectation.
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structure tends to be associated with less efficient supply
management.
Although this study is limited to manufacturing companies
listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange and only covers a specific
period of time, which in turn limits its general usage, some aspects
of the study encourage future research. Future studies may use
different proxies and time periods from those employed in this
study. Future studies could also explore the correlations between
different corporate governance variables and other indicators of
inventory management performance, such as punctuality and speed.
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